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Abstract 
 
For decades, earnings from farming in many African countries have been 
depressed by own-country policies such as export restrictions on cash crop products, as 
well as by governments of richer countries favoring their farmers with import barriers and 
subsidies. Both sets of policies have reduced national and global economic welfare, 
inhibited agricultural trade and economic growth, and may well have added to income 
inequality and poverty in Africa. During the past two decades, however, numerous 
African country governments have reduced their sectoral and trade policy distortions, 
while some high-income countries also have begun reducing market-distorting aspects of 
their farm policies. This paper provides new estimates of the changing extent of policy 
distortions to prices faced by African farmers over the past half century. It compares that 
pattern with similar estimates from Asia and Latin America, before discussing prospects 
for further pro-poor policy reform of agricultural price and trade policies. 
 









How far has Africa come in  




In the 1960s and 1970s, many African governments adopted macroeconomic, sectoral, trade 
and exchange rate policies that directly or indirectly taxed farm households seeking to export 
their way out of poverty (Bates 1982). This anti-agricultural, anti-trade policy stance, which 
was also prevalent in other developing country regions up to the early 1980s (Krueger, Schiff 
and Valdes 1988), has since begun to be reformed. How much has that bias been reduced in 
Africa as compared with other regions? This matters greatly for economic development and 
poverty alleviation, because agriculture is the major employer in Africa, especially of the 
poor, and it is often a key export sector. Relative changes in these policy stances could help 
explain Africa‘s development experience, including its relatively slow pace of economic 
growth to the 1980s and its faster income growth and poverty alleviation since then. 
However, many price distortions remain, and they could be limiting further progress. With 60 
percent of Sub-Saharan Africa‘s workforce still employed in agriculture, 39 percent of the 
population earning less than $1/day, and more than 80 percent of the region‘s poorest 
households depending directly or indirectly on farming for their livelihoods (World Bank 
2007, Chen and Ravallion 2008), policies affecting farmer incentives remain key influences 
on the pace of economic and social development in Africa. 
  This paper summarizes results from a large set of country case studies that include 
new estimates of the extent of distortions within and across countries over time. It is part of a 
global research project seeking to improve our understanding of agricultural price and trade 





the Caribbean as well as Africa.
1 The core of this project is a new set of annual time series 
estimates of assistance to and taxation of farmers over the past half century for 75 countries 
that together account for more than 90 percent of the world‘s population and agricultural 
output.  
From a global poverty perspective, including Africa in the study was crucial because 
the continent is home to many of the world‘s poorest people. In 2006 Sub-Saharan Africa 
accounted for less than 2 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) and exports and 
just 4 percent of agricultural GDP, but it also accounted for 12 percent of the world‘s farmers, 
16 percent of agricultural land, and 28 percent of those living on less than US$1 a day (World 
Bank 2008). 
The African sample in this study involves 21 countries that include Egypt (the largest 
and poorest country in north Africa) plus five countries of eastern Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda), five countries in southern Africa (Madagascar, Mozambique, 
South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe), five large economies in west Africa (Cameroon, Cote 
d‘Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal), and five smaller economies of west and central Africa 
for which cotton is a crucial export (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Togo). In 2000–04 
these economies (leaving aside Egypt) together accounted for all but one-tenth of the 
agricultural value added, farm households, total population and total GDP of Sub-Saharan 
Africa.
2 Estimates of distortions are provided for as many years as data permit over the past 
five decades (an average of 43 years), and for an average of 9 crop and livestock products per 
African country which in aggregate amounts to about 70 percent of the value of their 
                                                 
1 The regional studies are Anderson and Martin (2009), Anderson and Masters (2009), Anderson and Swinnen 
(2008), and Anderson and Valdés (2008). Together with comparable studies of high-income countries, they 
form the basis for a global overview volume (Anderson 2009). 
2 Unfortunately, because of inadequate time series data, our study under-represents the poorest and smallest 
African countries that are home to many of the ‗bottom billion‘ referred to in the recent book by Collier (2007), 
but some of those omitted least-developed countries will be included in a proposed follow-on project aimed at 






3 The relative importance of each of our sample countries in the world 
economy, and the extent of their inequality and poverty, are summarized in Table 1.  
Policy choices have had an important influence on the rates of economic growth, 
structural change and poverty alleviation observed in Africa. Many countries had increasingly 
severe anti-agricultural and anti-trade biases in their policy regimes in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The switch to policies that are less biased against farmers and trade began in some countries 
by the late 1970s but in many others only in the 1980s or even later. The transition is still on-
going, and is intermingled with periods of stalling and even of policy reversals, the most 
notable recent example being Zimbabwe. Agricultural price distortions are not the only target 
of policy reform of course, but they are a key aspect of economic policy in most African 
countries and have been increasingly recognized as such in recent years. For example, 
African heads of state re-acknowledged in Maputo in 2003 the contributions agriculture can 
make to meeting key Millennium Development Goals, by pledging to raise the government 
budget expenditure on agriculture to 10 percent by 2008. Donor support to Africa is also 
giving much more attention to agricultural public investments than it had in the closing 
decades of the 20
th century. The national economic benefits of such new investments in 
support of the sector will be greater, the less distorted are prices faced by farmers. This 
underlines the importance of having more reliable empirical information on the extent of such 
distortions, as NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa‘s Development) is to host in 2009 a high-
level meeting to review progress in implementing the Maputo declaration and to examine 
what more can be done to build a competitive and productive agricultural sector. 
This paper begins with a brief summary of the methodology used by the authors of the 
individual case studies to estimate the nominal rate of assistance (NRA), the corresponding 
consumer tax equivalent (CTE) facing domestic buyers of agricultural products, the relative 
                                                 
3 The time series, product and country coverage greatly exceed that of the earlier study by Krueger, Schiff and 
Valdes (1991), which focused on just 3-5 crops during the 1960-84 period in only 2 North African and 2 Sub-





rate of assistance (RRA) between the farm and nonfarm tradable sectors, and the international 
trade bias index (TBI) for farm products. A synopsis of the empirical results showing the 
changing extent of price distortions is then provided for each country, and the continental 
averages are compared with those of Asia and Latin America. The paper concludes by 
drawing out implications of the findings, including for poverty and inequality and for 






Methodology for measuring rates of assistance and taxation 
 
The nominal rate of assistance is defined as the percentage by which government policies 
have raised gross returns to farmers above what they would be without the government‘s 
intervention (or lowered them, if the NRA is negative). Similarly, the consumer tax 
equivalent is the percentage by which policies have raised prices paid by consumers of 
agricultural outputs. Negative values imply net taxation of farmers, or subsidies to 
consumers. The NRA and CTE will be identical if the sole source of government intervention 
is a trade measure and the two are measured at the same point in the value chain, but in 
general there will also be some domestic producer or consumer taxes or subsidies to 
differentiate them.
4 They are similar to the OECD (2007) producer and consumer support 
estimates (PSE and CSE), but an important difference is that they are expressed as a 
percentage of the undistorted (e.g., border) rather than the distorted price.  
Care is needed in estimating the NRA or CTE for an individual industry in countries 
where trade costs are high, pass-through along the value chain is affected by imperfect 
competition, and markets for foreign currency have been distorted at various times and to 
varying degrees in the past. Attention also needs to be given to how policy is actually 
implemented. Most distortions in markets for tradable goods come from trade measures, such 
as a tariff (or occasionally a subsidy) imposed on the import price or an export tax imposed at 
the country‘s border, or quantitative restrictions on trade. These are captured in the NRA and 
CTE at the point in the value chain where the product is first traded. To estimate the NRA for 
                                                 
4 Our definition of a policy-induced price distortion follows Bhagwati (1971) and Corden (1997) and includes 
any policy measure at a country‘s border (such as a trade tax or subsidy, a quantitative restriction on trade, or a 
dual or multiple foreign exchange rate system, assuming the country is small enough to have no monopoly 
power in international markets), or any domestic producer or consumer tax/subsidy/restraint on output, 
intermediate inputs or primary factors of production (except where needed to directly overcome an externality, 
or where it is set optimally across all products or factors, for example as a value added tax to raise government 
revenue). Chapter 4 of Corden (1997) deals with the possibility that trade taxes may be part of the optimal tax 





a typical farmer, authors of the country studies estimated or guessed the extent of pass-
through back to the farm gate, and added any domestic farm output subsidies. To obtain the 
CTE for a typical consumer, they also added any product-specific domestic consumer taxes 
or subsidies to the distortion from border prices.  
NRA and CTE estimates were made for each of the country‘s major farm products, in 
an attempt to cover at least 70 percent of the total gross value of farm production at 
undistorted prices. This target degree of coverage is similar to that for the OECD‘s PSEs. 
Unlike the OECD, however, in this project we do not routinely assume that the nominal 
assistance for covered products would apply equally to non-covered farm products. This is 
because in developing countries the agricultural policies affecting the non-covered products 
are often very different from those for the chosen covered products. For example, 
nontradables among non-covered farm goods (often highly perishable or low-valued products 
relative to their transport cost) are often not subject to direct distortionary policies. The 
authors of the country case studies were asked to provide three sets of ‗guesstimates‘ of the 
NRAs for that 30 percent of farm products not covered via direct price comparisons, one each 
for the import-competing, exportable and nontradable products not covered. Weighted 
averages for all agricultural products were then generated, using the gross values of 
production at unassisted prices as weights.
5 For countries that also provide non-product-
specific agricultural subsidies or taxes, such net assistance is then added to product-specific 
assistance to get an NRA for total agriculture, and also for tradable agriculture for use in 
generating the Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA, defined below).   
In addition to these average NRAs, it is important to provide also a measure of its 
dispersion or variability across products, because a set of dispersed distortions is more costly 
than a uniform rate of price distortion for each product. The cost of dispersion is even larger 
                                                 
5 Weighted averages for just the covered products are also provided, for those who wish to ignore (or substitute 





when there is a greater degree of substitution in production (Lloyd 1974). Land and labor is 
often specific to agriculture but highly transferable among farm activities, so one might 
expect variation of NRAs across farm products to be quite costly. A simple indicator of this 
kind of dispersion is the standard deviation of the NRA among covered products.  
Each industry is classified either as import-competing, or a producer of exportables, 
or as producing a nontradable (with its status sometimes changing over the years), so that it is 
possible to generate for each year the weighted average NRAs for the two different groups of 
tradables. Those NRAs are used to generate a trade bias index, TBI, defined as: 
(1)    TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1 
where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the import-competing and 
exportables parts of the agricultural sector. The TBI indicates in a single number the extent to 
which the typically anti-trade bias (negative TBI) in agricultural policies changes over time.  
Farmers are affected not just by prices of their own outputs but also, albeit indirectly 
via changes to factor market prices and the exchange rate, by the incentives nonagricultural 
producers face. That is, it is relative prices and hence relative rates of government assistance 
that affect producer incentives. More than seventy years ago Lerner (1936) proved his 
Symmetry Theorem which showed that in a two-sector economy, an import tax has the same 
effect as an export tax. This carries over to a model that also includes a third sector producing 
nontradables, to a model with imperfect competition, and regardless of the economy‘s size 
(Vousden 1990, pp. 46-47). If one assumes that there are no distortions in the markets for 
nontradables and that the value shares of agricultural and non-agricultural nontradable 
products remain constant, then the economy-wide effect of distortions to agricultural 
incentives can be captured by the extent to which the tradable parts of agricultural production 





average NRA for non-agricultural tradables, it is then possible to calculate a Relative Rate of 
Assistance, RRA, defined in percentage terms as: 
(2)    RRA = 100[(1+NRAag
t/100)/(1+NRAnonag
t/100) – 1] 
where NRAag
t and NRAnonag
t are the production-weighted average percentage NRAs for 
the tradable parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. Since the NRA 
cannot be less than -100 percent if producers are to earn anything, neither can the RRA 
(assuming NRAnonag
t is positive). And if both of those sectors are equally assisted, the RRA 
is zero. This measure is useful in that if it is below (above) zero, it provides an internationally 
comparable indication of the extent to which a country‘s policy regime has an anti- (pro-) 
agricultural bias. 
Exchange rate distortions generated by dual or multiple exchange-rate regimes are 
considered when calculating NRAs and CTEs, following the methodology outlined in 
Anderson et al. (2008). These have been important in many African countries, particularly 
during the 1970s and 1980s, making the absolute magnitude of their estimated (typically) 
positive NRAs for importables and (typically) negative NRAs for exportables larger than they 
otherwise would have been.  
While the NRAs and RRAs can be a guide to the extent of welfare-reducing resource 
misallocation caused by price-distorting policies, it should be kept in mind that other 
considerations can also affect the welfare cost of those policies. Corden (1997) reminds us of 
at least two worth keeping in mind. One is that a country may have a sufficiently high share 
of global production of a particular product as to have some degree of monopoly power in the 
international market in the short run. Any such power is likely to be much lower in the longer 
run, however, because of supply response capabilities of other countries. In any case, one 
purpose of measuring the difference between domestic and border prices is to provide a price 





economic welfare effects (including via a change in the country‘s international terms of 
trade) of removing such a wedge. The other consideration worthy of mention is that a country 
may be so underdeveloped that the cost of raising essential tax revenue to finance public 
goods is prohibitive other than via trade taxes. In that case, and assuming a country has no 
long-run monopoly power in the global market for any of its exported products, the optimal 




Estimates of policy-induced distortions in Africa 
 
We begin with the nominal rates of assistance to agriculture, and then compare them with the 
nominal rates for non-agricultural tradables by calculating the relative rates of assistance.  
 
Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture 
 
Agricultural price, trade and exchange rate policies have reduced the earnings of African 
farmers substantially. The average rate of taxation as measured by the weighted average NRA 
was less than 8 percent at the time many Africa countries achieved independence around 
1960, but then rose sharply during the 1960s and 1970s as interventions became more severe. 
Reforms have since reduced the average extent of taxation back to its level of the early 
1960s. There was even a brief period in the mid-1980s when a combination of policy reforms 
                                                 
6 See Corden (1997, Ch. 4). In principle an alternative measure could be a uniform tax on every imported 
product, but in practice that is likely to involve higher collection costs because (a) countries tend to export far 
fewer products than they import and (b) importables are likely to be more easily smuggled than exportables for 
countries whose exports are mainly bulky, low-priced primary products. If tax raising was the sole motivation 
for intervention at the border, there would be no role for quantitative restrictions (QRs) on trade. In practice QRs 
and uneven rates of taxation of both exports and imports have been as commonplace in African as in other 
developing countries, suggesting revenue raising is not the only motive for the trade policies observed. This 
study‘s provision of NRA and CTE estimates hopefully will stimulate a public finance economist to analyse the 





and low international commodity prices brought the region‘s weighted average agricultural 
NRA to near zero (table 2).  
Africa-wide averages hide considerable diversity within the region, however. The 
major reductions in taxing of farmers has been in such countries as Ghana,Uganda, Tanzania, 
Cameroon, Senegal and Madagascar, while in Mozambique and to a lesser extent Kenya 
there has been a transition from taxing to supporting farmers. The opposite transition, from 
slight support to slight taxation, has occurred in Nigeria; and the degree of taxation is still 
heavy in Cote d‘Ivoire, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
There is also much within-country dispersion of product NRAs, as shown in table 3 
by their standard deviation around the weighted mean NRA for covered agricultural products 
in each country. This dispersion was highest in the middle of our 50-year period, when the 
NRAs were most distorting, but even after the recent reforms the intra-country dispersion is 
no less on average than it was at the beginning of the period. Almost all of that dispersion 
comes from tradables, because governments tend to intervene much less in markets for 
nontradable farm products. This raises questions as to how far from the optimum was the 
structure of trade taxes from the viewpoints of exploiting any monopoly power in global 
markets and efficient tax revenue raising (answers to which are beyond the scope of the 
present study). 
Variation among products in their regional weighted average NRAs has a similar 
pattern in Africa as in Asia and Latin America: assistance is among the highest for the rice 
pudding ingredients of sugar, rice and milk, and is most negative for tropical cash crops such 
as coffee, cotton, cocoa and tobacco (table 4). 
Across countries, there is considerable diversity of national average NRAs too. This is 
evident from the bottom of table 2: NRA averages for the agricultural sector became more 





1980s, and then more similar again so that by 2000-04 this type of NRA dispersion was back 
to what it had been in the early 1960s.  
  Another very important type of variation is differential treatment of import-competing 
and exportable products, in a way that often favors self-sufficiency. The extent of anti-trade 
bias is shown in figure 1, as the gap between the average NRAs for import-competing and 
exportable products. This gap remained sizable from 1960 to the early 1980s before enlarging 
briefly and then narrowing. The reduction in the degree of anti-trade bias shown in figure 1 is 
reflected in a lower share of trade taxes in total government revenues since 1980 (see World 
Bank 2008). One reason for declining taxation of trade is that farmers have substituted away 
from production of heavily-taxed crops. Since the late 1970s, the share of tradable farm 
products that are exportables has fallen from two-thirds to just over one-half (from 67 to 54 
percent in 2000-04), which has helped bring the aggregate NRA towards zero (see dashed 
line in figure 1). Even so, significant constraints on trade continue to be imposed at the 
border.  
In summary, the level and dispersion of agricultural NRAs confirm that there has been 
substantial reform towards less distortion of farmer incentives since the 1980s. However, they 
also suggest that there are still many opportunities for welfare-improving policy through 
improving resource allocation within and between countries‘ agricultural sectors.   
 
Consumer tax equivalents of agricultural policies 
 
If there were no farm input distortions and no domestic output price distortions so that the 
NRA was entirely the result of border measures such as an import or export tax or restriction, 
and there were no domestic consumption taxes or subsidies in place, then the CTE would 





countries, the value of consumption weights used in getting the CTEs are quite different from 
the value of production weights used for getting weighted average NRAs (both measured at 
undistorted prices). That is particularly so for those countries exporting cash crops in order to 
import staple foods. Yet even though the average CTEs are somewhat different from the 
average NRAs for numerous countries, the weighted average CTE for the region as a whole 
has moved much like the regional NRA: starting at around -10 percent at the time of 
independence, falling to -17 percent (that is, a 17 percent consumer subsidy equivalent) by 
the early 1970s, and then gradually lessening and eventually reaching close to zero (with a 
blip in the latter 1980s when Egypt overshot in its reform efforts to reduce the suppression of 
domestic food prices just when the international price of food fell to record low levels). The 
variance in both national CTEs within countries and in product CTEs across countries also 
rose before the reforms and fell after the latter 1980s (see Anderson and Masters 2009, table 
1.20).  
 
Assistance to non-farm sectors and relative rates of assistance 
 
The anti-farm policy biases of the past were due to not just agricultural policies but also 
policies affecting mobile resources engaged in other sectors. For example, to the extent that 
protection to manufacturing also has declined over time, the relative burden on agriculture 
has diminished even more than the agricultural NRA suggests.   
The World Bank study aimed to capture inter-sectoral effects in the tradables part of 
the economy through using the NRA also for non-agricultural products to generate the 
relative rate of assistance to producers of farm as compared with nonfarm tradable goods. For 
want of reliable data, the estimates of the NRA for non-farm tradables rely mainly on import 





quotas/licenses and other quantitative restrictions on imports, and in other cases may miss 
any taxing of non-farm exportables such as minerals or petroleum.
7 In the absence of more 
reliable estimates, it is implictly assumed that the non-measured protective effect of 
quantitative restrictions on imports exactly offsets any non-measured taxes or quantitative 
restrictions on exports of nonfarm tradables. 
The estimated NRAs for nonfarm tradables are non-trivial: their unweighted average 
among the African focus countries rose from around 12 percent in the 1960s to 27 percent 
during 1975-84 before declining to around 15 percent during the most recent decade or so. As 
a result, the unweighted RRA is lower and dips even more in the middle of the studied period 
(to -42 percent) than does the NRA for agriculture, before returning at the end of the period to 
around the -20 percent it was in the early 1960s (figure 2(a)). These trends are more muted 
when country rates are weighted by undistorted value of agricultural production, as shown in 
figure 2(b). The difference between the two parts of figure 2 reflects the wide differences in 
the size of farm output across African countries: in 2000-04, Nigeria accounted for one-fifth, 
three other countries (Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan) for one-tenth each, and South Africa for 
over 7 percent, such that the other 16 countries accounted for barely two-fifths of all focus 
African countries‘ agricultural output. 
Even after the reforms since the 1980s, only three of those focus countries had a set of 
incentives in 2000-04 that was neutral as between agriculture and other tradable sectors, 
namely South Africa, Mozambique and Kenya. But none other than Zimbabwe had a worse 
set of intersectoral distortions in 2000-04 than in the 1970s, in the sense that their RRAs were 
closer to zero in the earlier period.  
                                                 
7 In most countries the mining sector‘s production value is small relative to that of manufacturing, so the weight 
of minerals and energy raw materials in nonfarm tradables production used to generate NRAnonag also is small. 
Nonetheless, as and when better estimates of distortions to non-farm sectors become available they can be 
inserted in the national spreadsheets provided at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions to revise the RRA estimates. 





Thus in addition to the slight reduction in the anti-trade bias of agricultural policies, 
depicted in figure 1, there has been a non-trivial reduction in the anti-agricultural bias in 
Africa‘s policy regimes (figure 2). A way of summarizing that combined progress in reform 
is provided in figure 3, which shows values of agriculture‘s trade bias index (TBI) on the 
horizontal axis and the RRA on the vertical axis. An economy with no anti-agricultural bias 
(RRA = 0) and no anti-trade bias within the farm sector (TBI = 0) would be located at the 
intersection of the two axes in the upper right-hand corner. In 1975-79, South Africa was the 
only economy anywhere near that point, and most other Sub-Saharan African economies 
were far to the southwest of it, indicating both an anti-agricultural bias and an anti-trade 
policy bias within the sector. In 2000-04, by contrast, Kenya and Nigeria were also close to 
that neutrality point, and all the other countries shown were far closer than they were in the 
late 1970s. This is not to say there are few distortions left within the agricultural sector 
though, for two reasons. One is that the RRA and TBI values, in the ranges -20 to -40 and -
0.2 to -0.4, respectively, are not small. The other reason is that within most countries‘ 
agricultural sector there is still a wide dispersion of product NRAs. Note also in figure 3 that 
the 2000-04 values fit roughly along a 45-degree line, as the tax burden on agriculture in 
these countries consists primarily of taxes on trade. 
 
Africa compared with other regions 
 
Trends in intersectoral RRAs for Africa, Asia and Latin America are summarized in figure 4, 
showing that other regions have had similar – but even steeper – upward trends in their RRAs 
over most of the past four decades. The same is true of their agricultural NRAs. These 
similarities suggest that common political economy forces are at work. Indeed, the tendency 





comparative advantage in trade (for reasons suggested by Anderson and Hayami 1986 and 
Anderson 1995) is confirmed statistically, using individual product variables to generate 
multiple regression equations with country and time fixed effects (table 6). Indeed the 
African regression results are just as statistically significant as those for Asia and even more 
than those for Latin America (see Chapter 1 of both Anderson and Martin 2009 and Anderson 
and Valdés 2008).  
 
 
Have government interventions stabilized domestic food prices? 
 
Leaving aside the issue of differences between trend levels of domestic and international 
prices, to what extent have domestic food price fluctuations been modified by breaking the 
link between the internal and external price series? There are various ways of addressing that 
question. Here we use just three simple indicators, for the period 1970 to 2004. In each case 
we convert domestic prices to US dollars with the equilibrium exchange rate used to generate 
NRAs, and then we express all prices in real terms by converting to 2000 dollars using the 
US GDP deflator. The indicators are all ratios of a domestic to an international price measure, 
the measures themselves being: the standard deviation of that price around its period mean; 
the coefficient of variation in that price (its standard deviation divided by its period mean); 
and the standard deviation of year-on-year price changes, known as the z-statistic.
8 The 
international prices used here reflect the same reference market for all countries, rather than 
the country‘s own border price.     
                                                 
8 To be precise, the z-statistic is the square root of the average squared deviation of the price from its 
value lagged one period, or the first differences in price. See Schiff and Valdes (1992, Appendix 3-2) for 





Each indicator provides a different perspective on price variability. The ratio of 
standard deviations (SD) is directly comparable to the ratio of the z-statistic (Z), with the 
former capturing price differences between each year and the mean of all years, and the latter 
capturing price differences between each year and the previous year. The ratio of coefficients 
of variation (CV) uses the same information as SD, but controls for the period-average price 
level. 
  These indicators are shown for five key products in Table 7. They suggest that, on 
average for our sample of African countries, domestic prices over the 1970-2004 period have 
indeed been more stable than the international reference prices for all of those products 
except maize. Domestic prices typically fluctuate less than international reference price in 
other regions as well. Developing countries as a whole have much more price stability than 
Africa in maize, and roughly similar levels of price stability for the other crops. High-income 
countries have more stability than Africa in sugar as well as maize. For cotton and rice, the 
high-income countries have higher standard deviations over time, but their price levels are so 
much higher that their CVs are actually smaller than in Africa.  
 
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
Each of the African country case studies, reported in Anderson and Masters (2009), provides 
detailed insights into Africa‘s wide variety of country experiences. Aggregating their results 
to characterize all of Africa necessarily obscures much of that detail, but its virtue is that it 
allows some generalizations. The principal findings are the following. 
  Since the 1980s, African governments have removed much of their earlier anti-





  Substantial distortions remain, so own-country policies continue to dampen farmer 
returns in Africa, unlike in Asia and Latin America where on average the policy 
regime has become neutral; 
  African farmers have become less taxed in part because of the changing trade 
orientation of African agriculture, with the decline in the share of output that is 
exportable and a corresponding rise in the share from import-competing agricultural 
industries; and 
  Differences across commodities and countries in their NRAs and RRAs have become 
smaller since the 1980s but they are still very substantial, including differences in 
rates for exportables and import-competing sub-sectors.  
 
These results suggest that, notwithstanding recent reforms, there remains plenty of 
scope for improving the efficiency of agricultural resource use in Africa by moving towards 
lower and more uniform assistance/taxation rates within the farm sector, and between 
countries within the region. In particular, reducing further the anti-trade bias within the 
agricultural sector could boost agricultural earnings of the more-productive farmers.  
Based on the experience of agricultural policy transitions in other regions, though, 
care is needed to ensure there is not ‗overshooting‘ as export taxation is reduced. It is not 
uncommon for governments in growing economies to be concerned about farm household 
incomes falling behind those of nonfarm households, and of export-oriented farmers doing 
better than import-competing ones. Yet increasingly protecting import-competing agricultural 
industries can be just as wasteful, in terms of resource misallocation and slower national 
economic growth, as taxing agricultural exporters.  
Income distributional issues can be addressed in far more efficient ways than by 





and Asia: some members of farm households work full- or part-time off the farm and 
repatriate part part of their higher earnings back to those remaining on the farm (Otsuka and 
Yamano 2006, World Bank 2007). Concerted government interventions through targeted 
social policy measures can also provide more efficient and effective ways to reduce gaps 
between farm and nonfarm incomes – and at the same time raise national incomes overall 
(Winters, McCulloch and McKay 2004). This is especially so if such measures are 
accompanied by improvements in market institutions and well-targeted investments in new 
farm technologies and rural public goods such as basic education and health and transport and 
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Figure 1: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, import-competing and all
a agricultural 
products, African region, 1960 to 2004 
 
(percent, weighted averages)  
       
Sources: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Anderson and 
Masters (2009). 
a. The total NRA can be above or below the exportable and importable averages because 
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Figure 2: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and non-agricultural tradable products 
and relative rate of assistance,
a Africa,
b 1960 to 2004 
 
  (percent)  
 









Sources: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Anderson and 
Masters (2009). 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural 
and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 
b.  The five focus countries for which RRAs were not estimated are the cotton-exporting 
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Figure 3: Relationship between RRA and the trade bias index for agriculture, African focus 
countries, 1975–79 and 2000–04 
a.  1975–79 
 
 
b.  2000–04 
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Figure 4: Relative rates of assistance,
a Africa, Asia, and Latin America,





























Sources: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Anderson and 
Masters (2009). 
a. 5-year weighted averages with value of production at undistorted prices as weights.  
b. In Asia, estimates for China pre-1981 are based on the assumption that the nominal rate of 
assistance to agriculture in those earlier years was the same as the average NRA estimates for 






















Table 1: Key economic and trade indicators, African focus countries, 2000-04  























Benin   0.12  0.01  0.09  7  55  1034  31  39 
Burkina Faso   0.19  0.01  0.09  5  111  953  29  40 
Cameroon   0.25  0.03  0.38  13  74  445  15  45 
Chad   0.14  0.01  0.07  5  695  na  na  na 
Cote d‘Ivoire   0.28  0.04  0.21  12  139  722  18  48 
Egypt   1.13  0.26  1.11  23  6  175  2  34 
Ethiopia   1.08  0.02  0.23  2  58  958  12  30 
Ghana   0.33  0.02  0.2  6  88  748  17  41 
Kenya   0.52  0.04  0.29  8  103  636  12  43 
Madagascar   0.28  0.01  0.1  5  202  670  63  47 
Mali   0.2  0.01  0.1  5  353  624  39  40 
Mozambique   0.3  0.01  0.08  4  324  359  30  47 
Nigeria   1.98  0.15  1.09  8  73  3  71  44 
Senegal   0.17  0.02  0.09  10  94  444  13  41 
South Africa   0.73  0.42  0.39  59  275  134  9  58 
Sudan   0.55  0.05  0.5  8  490  209  na  na 
Tanzania   0.58  0.03  0.33  5  166  800  56  35 
Togo   0.09  0  0.05  5  80  407  na  na 
Uganda   0.42  0.02  0.15  4  60  938  83  46 
Zambia   0.18  0.01  0.07  7  398  194  60  51 
Zimbabwe   0.21  0.04  0.14  18  200  602  62  50 
African focus countries  9.73  1.21  5.74  13  145  na  na  na 
All Sub-Saharan Africa  9.37  0.98  4.93  10  164  na  41  na 
All North Africa  2.34  0.70  2.81  30  84  na  na  na 
All Africa  11.7
1 
1.67  7.74  14  148  na  32  na 
                  Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2008), compiled mainly from World Bank‘s 
World Development Indicators. 
a. Revealed Comparative Advantage = share of agriculture and processed food in national 
exports as a ratio of that sector‘s share of global exports 
 
b. Percentage of population living on <US$1/day, from Chen and Ravallion (2007).  
c. Gini Indices for the most recent year available between 2000 and 2004 in the World 




Table 2: Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture,
a African focus countries, 1955 to 2004
c 
(percent)  
   Region  1955-59  1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04 
Cameroon   W  na  -2.9  -6.0  -7.4  -14.4  -11.2  -2.4  -1.1  -1.3  -0.1 
Cote d‘Ivoire   W  na  -23.5  -29.3  -28.1  -30.8  -32.2  -24.3  -19.5  -20.0  -24.5 
Egypt   N  -23.2  -33.9  -37.7  -37.5  -15.9  -9.2  56.6  -6.1  4.0  -6.1 
Ethiopia   E  na  na  na  na  na  -17.5  -22.3  -24.4  -17.8  -11.2 
Ghana   W  -4.4  -9.0  -19.8  -14.9  -25.6  -21.2  -6.3  -1.7  -3.0  -1.4 
Kenya   E  26.6  23.0  9.7  -11.8  -1.7  -18.6  10.5  -5.8  2.4  9.3 
Madagascar   S  0.2  -5.9  -11.1  -13.5  -27.1  -38.8  -18.2  -5.4  -2.9  1.0 
Mozambique   S  na  na  na  na  -34.5  -25.2  -32.0  -2.7  3.9  12.4 
Nigeria   W  na  20.7  11.9  6.7  6.3  9.4  8.2  3.9  0.4  -5.4 
Senegal   W  na  -9.3  -7.2  -22.4  -22.7  -20.5  4.7  5.6  -6.1  -7.5 
South Africa   S  na  4.1  9.4  -0.7  3.8  22.9  11.7  10.8  5.7  -0.1 
Sudan   E  -11.7  -20.4  -31.8  -43.4  -24.3  -29.3  -35.4  -47.8  -24.5  -11.9 
Tanzania   E  na  na  na  na  -41.8  -56.3  -45.3  -25.2  -23.2  -12.4 
Uganda   E  na  -1.8  -3.1  -7.8  -17.6  -6.2  -6.8  -0.6  0.5  0.4 
Zambia   S  na  na  -22.4  -15.8  -37.3  -2.7  -58.9  -30.8  -28.6  -28.5 
Zimbabwe   S  16.9  -27.2  -25.5  -26.0  -28.6  -24.0  -24.1  -24.9  -20.8  -38.7 
African focus countries: 
Unweighted average
b  na  -7.8  -12.5  -12.9  -15.5  -13.7  -8.9  -8.7  -6.6  -6.0 
Weighted. average
a  na  -7.7  -11.3  -14.7  -12.7  -7.9  -1.0  -8.9  -5.7  -7.3 
Dispersion of individual country agric NRAs 
c  na  13.4  15.1  14.3  17.1  21.2  29.5  16.1  12.3  13.5 
Sources: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Anderson and Masters (2009). 
a. Weighted average for each country, including product-specific output and input distortions and non-product-specific assistance as well as 
authors‘ guesstimates for non-covered farm products, with weights based on gross value of agricultural production at undistorted prices. 
Cameroon, Cote D‘Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda and Zambia data under 1960-64 are 1961-64; Tanzania data under 1975-79 are 1976-79; 
and Ethiopia data under 1980-84 are 1981-84. 
b. The unweighted average is the simple average across the 16 countries of their national NRA (weighted) average NRAs.  





Table 3: Dispersion of nominal rates of assistance across covered agricultural products within each African focus country,




   1955-59  1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04 
Cameroon   na  14  18  22  29  21  17  16  13  8 
Cote d‘Ivoire   na  25  28  33  46  33  33  26  23  33 
Egypt   22  15  17  21  32  32  90  33  29  22 
Ethiopia   na  na  na  na  na  26  28  28  29  24 
Ghana   10  17  30  29  48  70  56  26  17  26 
Kenya   33  26  31  21  27  22  24  23  25  26 
Madagascar   na  31  25  25  38  39  42  39  30  23 
Mozambique   na  na  na  na  35  36  40  29  33  38 
Nigeria   na  113  95  94  90  92  94  83  73  53 
Senegal   na  20  16  34  45  38  59  67  14  19 
South Africa   26  18  19  25  32  43  35  32  20  20 
Sudan   34  35  34  36  40  32  54  75  41  63 
Tanzania   na  na  na  na  39  39  41  47  47  52 
Uganda   na  8  12  29  47  39  41  8  7  7 
Zambia   na  15  30  27  36  35  35  39  36  38 
Zimbabwe   75  71  47  37  28  28  24  25  25  34 
African focus countries: 
Unweighted average
b  33  31  31  33  41  39  45  37  29  30 
Product coverage 
c  68  73  72  72  70  67  66  66  66  68 
Sources: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Anderson and Masters (2009). 
a. Dispersion for each country is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around a weighted mean of NRAs across covered 
products each year. Cameroon, Cote D‘Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda and Zambia data under 1960-64 are 1961-64; Tanzania data under 
1975-79 are 1976-79; and Ethiopia data under 1980-84 are 1981-84. 
b. The unweighted average is the simple average across the 16 countries of their 5-year simple average dispersion measures. 




Table 4: Nominal rates of assistance, key covered farm products, all African focus countries,
a 1955 to 2004 
 
(percent, weighted averages) 
 
   1955-59  1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04 
Banana  na  -2  -4  0  -2  -1  -1  3  5  1 
Bean  na  6  2  -3  -39  -53  -66  -25  -24  -25 
Beef  -13  -21  -29  -37  4  11  23  -38  -1  -26 
Cassava  0  0  0  0  1  2  1  -1  -3  -3 
Cocoa  -14  -27  -54  -48  -60  -52  -36  -35  -32  -36 
Coffee  -11  -27  -36  -44  -62  -53  -42  -37  -21  -12 
Cotton  -16  -41  -53  -54  -49  -43  -31  -54  -38  -46 
Groundnut  -29  -27  -38  -51  -46  -44  -17  -30  -36  -40 
Maize  -4  12  3  -7  -12  1  38  8  2  -5 
Milk  -35  -22  -32  -42  -1  -22  67  -27  -8  15 
Millet  -77  -19  -6  -4  -1  1  0  1  -3  -2 
Palmoil  na  -25  -31  -44  -17  -25  -12  108  41  -13 
Plantain  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Poultry  na  -13  -13  -16  -24  18  -3  6  13  3 
Rice  -62  -38  -39  -22  -14  -14  29  0  -8  -5 
Sesame  -40  -53  -64  -65  -68  -60  -48  -48  -50  -38 
Sheepmeat  -12  -14  -18  -22  -21  -20  -37  -49  -45  -21 
Sorghum  -35  62  87  49  28  17  41  37  23  21 
Soybean  na  na  -14  -30  -43  -43  -40  -53  -50  -54 
Sugar  -22  -6  11  -24  -11  -1  42  2  7  44 
Sunflower  na  15  17  6  7  16  7  6  -6  -4 
Tea  3  9  -7  -20  -30  -34  -29  -40  -28  -16 
Tobacco  na  -42  -38  -45  -54  -47  -48  -38  -34  -63 
Vanilla  na  -62  -53  -39  -57  -76  -85  -78  -28  -13 
Wheat  -13  -27  -13  -6  12  -5  19  4  1  -1 
Yam  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  -1  -4  -3 
All covered products  -19.9  -13.0  -17.8  -22.1  -20.3  -12.1  0.9  -12.4  -6.6  -8.9 
 




Table 5: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural industries, African region, 1960 to 2004 
  
(percent, weighted averages) 
 
     1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04 
Covered products    -13.0  -17.8  -22.1  -20.3  -12.1  0.9  -12.4  -6.6  -8.9 
Non-covered products    3.6  1.8  -0.2  -0.3  -3.3  -7.6  -4.8  -5.1  -5.2 
All agricultural products    -8.4  -12.2  -15.6  -13.8  -9.5  -2.0  -10.0  -6.1  -7.7 
Total agricultural NRA (incl. NPS)
b    -7.7  -11.3  -14.7  -12.7  -7.9  -1.0  -8.9  -5.7  -7.3 
Trade Bias Index
c    -0.41  -0.45  -0.44  -0.50  -0.43  -0.60  -0.39  -0.33  -0.26 
                     
Assistance to just tradables: 
   All agricultural tradables
b    -13.3  -19.6  -25.0  -22.1  -13.5  -0.3  -15.4  -8.7  -12.0 
   All non-agricultural tradables    3.7  2.7  1.5  5.7  1.6  9.2  2.7  2.0  7.3 
Relative rate of assistance, RRA
a    -15.2  -21.4  -26.0  -25.9  -13.1  -8.3  -17.1  -10.4  -18.0 
MEMO, ignoring exchange rate distortions:                     
  Total agricultural NRA    -5.2  -7.3  -11.6  -8.9  -3.7  5.6  -6.7  -5.6  -6.2 
  Trade bias index, all agric.    -0.14  -0.17  -0.16  -0.29  -0.05  -0.26  -0.01  0.30  0.20 
  Relative rate of assistance, RRA
a    -9.7  -13.4  -17.7  -17.0  -2.7  5.9  -12.7  -11.8  -16.1 
Sources: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Anderson and Masters (2009). 




t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts 
of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
b. NRAs including non-product-specific (NPS) assistance, that is, the assistance to all primary factors and intermediate inputs as a percentage of 
the total primary agricultural production valued at undistorted prices. 
c. Trade Bias Index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the 
import-competing and exportable parts of the agricultural sector. The regional average TBI is calculated from the regional averages of the NRAs 




Table 6: Relationships between nominal rates of assistance and some of its determinants,
c 
African focus countries, 1960 to 2004   
 
Explanatory variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         





























a        0.02* 
(0.01) 
Trade Specialization Index
b      0.09* 
(0.04) 
 








         
R
2  0.13  0.27  0.28  0.28 
Number of observations  5372  5372  3788  3838 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Source: Authors‘ estimates 
a. Revealed comparative advantage index is the share of agriculture and processed food 
in national exports as a ratio of that sector‘s share of global exports (world=1). 
b. Net exports as a ratio of the sum of exports and imports of agricultural and processed 
food products (world=1). 
c. Dependent variable for regressions is NRA by commodity, country and year. Results 
are OLS estimates, with standard errors in parentheses and significance levels shown at 




Table 7: Indicators of domestic food market insulation,
a five products, Africa and other focus countries, 1970 to 2004 
  sugar  coffee  cotton  rice  maize 
  SD  CV  Z  SD  CV  Z  SD  CV  Z  SD  CV  Z  SD  CV  Z 
International ref price
d  376.8  0.93  338  1788.5  0.58  1211  976.1  0.41  549.6  283  0.63  203  75.6  0.44  38.2 
Benin  na  na  na  na  na  na  0.09  0.51  0.09  na  na  na  na  na  na 
Burkina Faso   na  na  na  na  na  na  0.09  0.56  0.11  na  na  na  na  na  na 
Cameroon  na  na  na  0.41  0.69  0.35  0.13  0.68  0.15  na  na  na  5.79  1.57  2.55 
Chad  na  na  na  na  na  na  0.09  0.59  0.10  na  na  na  na  na  na 
Cote d‘Ivoire  na  na  na  0.39  0.98  0.35  0.20  1.10  0.14  0.89  1.06  0.67  na  na  na 
Egypt  0.08  0.57  0.06  na  na  na  0.37  0.95  0.53  0.41  0.73  0.47  2.02  1.23  2.98 
Ethiopia  na  na  na  0.38  0.64  0.40  na  na  na  na  na  na  0.66  1.89  0.68 
Ghana  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  1.09  0.73  1.59  1.94  1.07  4.48 
Kenya  0.02  0.25  0.01  1.18  1.03  1.14  na  na  na  na  na  na  0.70  0.52  0.93 
Madagascar  0.03  0.43  0.02  0.37  1.03  0.51  na  na  na  0.27  0.48  0.38  2.34  1.41  3.59 
Mali  na  na  na  na  na  na  0.08  0.51  0.11  na  na  na  na  na  na 
Mozambique  0.03  0.54  0.02  na  na  na  0.09  1.24  0.12  0.36  1.16  0.54  0.88  1.16  1.58 
Nigeria  na  na  na  na  na  na  0.46  3.24  0.43  1.34  0.89  1.06  4.15  1.36  4.95 
Senegal  na  na  na  na  na  na  0.10  0.59  0.11  0.41  0.54  0.37  na  na  na 
South Africa  0.03  0.37  0.02  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  0.63  0.59  0.74 
Sudan  0.84  0.57  0.46  na  na  na  0.50  1.73  0.75  na  na  na  na  na  na 
Tanzania  0.01  0.38  0.01  0.49  1.00  0.50  0.09  0.83  0.14  0.44  0.60  0.47  0.85  0.75  1.77 
Togo  na  na  na  na  na  na  0.11  0.63  0.10  na  na  na  na  na  na 
Uganda  0.54  1.60  0.66  0.10  0.83  0.11  0.09  0.83  0.13  1.09  0.97  1.46  1.48  1.59  3.90 
Zambia  na  na  na  na  na  na  0.26  1.41  0.28  0.55  0.98  0.57  0.81  0.98  1.28 
Zimbabwe  na  na  na  na  na  na  0.24  1.07  0.27  na  na  na  0.50  0.70  0.82 
Africa
e  0.18  0.51  0.12  0.48  0.88  0.46  0.34  1.37  0.44  0.62  0.73  0.61  1.19  1.20  1.49 
Asia
e  0.32  0.52  0.16  0.68  1.19  0.70  0.27  1.59  0.30  0.28  0.76  0.25  0.44  0.71  0.58 
Latin America
e  0.02  0.40  0.01  0.52  0.83  0.56  0.27  1.07  0.30  0.43  0.78  0.40  0.87  0.86  1.06 
Developing countries
e  0.21  0.48  0.11  0.52  0.88  0.55  0.29  1.46  0.34  0.29  0.76  0.26  0.73  0.87  0.92 
High-income countries
e  0.06  0.45  0.06  na  na  na  0.72  0.87  0.68  2.08  0.56  1.50  0.96  1.07  1.03 
World





a SD is the ratio of two standard deviations (respectively around the period mean price domestically, and internationally); CV is the ratio of two coefficients 
of variation (which in turn is the standard deviation divided by the period mean), again one referring to the domestic price and the other to the international 
price; and Z is the ratio of two z-statistics (which is the square root of the average squared deviation of the price from its value lagged one period, or the first 
differences in price — see Schiff and Valdes 1992, Appendix 3-2), again one referring to the domestic price and the other to the international price. The 
smaller these indicators are as a fraction of unity, the more stable is the domestic price relative to the international price. Both international and domestic 
country-level prices are expressed in $US and in real terms using the 2000 US GDP deflator. Regional sub-totals are weighted using the national product-
level values of production at undistorted prices. The international reference prices are the following from the World Bank‘s Commodity Outlook series: 
Sugar: International Sugar Agreement (ISA) daily price, raw, f.o.b. and stowed at greater Caribbean ports 
Coffee: International Coffee Organization indicator price, Robusta, average New York and Le Havre/Marseilles markets, ex-dock 
Cotton: "Cotlook A index" middling 1-3/32 inch, average of cheapest 5 of 15 styles traded in Northern Europe, c.i.f. 
Rice: Thai, 5% broken, white rice (WR), milled, indicative price based on weekly surveys of export transactions, government standard, f.o.b. Bangkok 
Maize: US, no. 2, yellow, f.o.b. US Gulf ports. 
 
Source: Anderson, Croser, Nelgen and Valenzuela (2009). 
 